Justification logics are modal logics that include justifications for the agent's knowledge. So far, there are no decidability results available for justification logics with negative introspection. In this paper, we develop a novel model construction for such logics and show that justification logics with negative introspection are decidable for finite constant specifications.
Introduction
Justification logic is a variant of modal logic that features explicit reasons for an agent's knowledge. Formally, justification logic includes statements of the form t : F meaning F is known for reason t instead of the simple F meaning F is known. The evidence term t in the statement t:F can represent an informal justification why F is known or a formal mathematical proof of F .
The first justification logic, the Logic of Proofs, was introduced by Artemov [1, 2] to provide the modal logic S4 with a provability semantics. Later it has been observed that justification logics also are a powerful tool in the context of epistemic logic, see for instance [3, 4, 6] .
From the beginning, decidability of justification logics has been an important issue. Already in [1] , Artemov established decidability for the Logic of Proofs with any finite constant specification. The constant specification is an essential ingredient of a justification logic: it states which evidence constants justify which axioms of the logic. The concrete form of the constant specification matters a lot with respect to decidability. For instance, Kuznets [15] presented a decidable constant specification such that the corresponding Logic of Proofs is undecidable. Mkrtychev [17] was able to show that the Logic of Proofs is decidable for schematic constant specifications. Kuznets [14] then provided decidability results for justification logics with schematic constant specifications that correspond to the modal logics K, KT, and K4. Vladimir Krupski [10, 11, 12, 13] obtained several decidability results for single conclusion justification logics. Decidability for justification logics that combine knowledge and justifications was established in [5, 19, 20] where the constant specification is again required to be finite.
An excellent survey on these results as well as many new decidability theorems for justification logics can be found in Kuznets' PhD thesis [16] . He also presents a detailed analysis on what is needed to obtain decidability of a logic. In particular, he carefully states the following lemma, see [16, Lemma 4.3 .1].
Lemma 1. Let a finitely axiomatizable logic L be sound and complete with respect to a class of models C, such that 1. the class C is recursively enumerable, and 2. the binary relation M F between formulae and models from C is decidable.
Then L is decidable.
What is missing so far are decidability results for justification logics with negative introspection. In the present paper we establish first decidability theorems for logics of this kind. In particular, we show that the justification logics J5 CS , J45 CS , JT5 CS , and JT45 CS are decidable for finite constant specifications CS.
One source of trouble for showing decidability for negative introspection is that the usual decidability proofs rely on minimal evidence relations. The evidence relation is that part of the semantics for justification logics that specifies which evidence terms are admissible evidence for which formulae. For logics without negative introspection, the evidence relation can be generated by a positive inductive definition and hence there is a minimal evidence relation. This does no longer work for negative introspection since negative introspection (as the name says) cannot be dealt with by a positive operator form.
Another problem one encounters is that justification logics with negative introspection are only sound with respect to strong models. A strong model requires that if, according to the model, a term t is admissible evidence for a formula F , then t : F is satisfied in the model. Justification logics without negative introspection are also sound with respect to models that do not fulfill this strong evidence property.
To solve the first problem, we develop a novel model construction that is based on non-monotone inductive definitions. Such inductive definitions are important for generalized recursion theory and the proof-theoretic analysis of strong systems, see for instance [9, 18] . However, in the present paper we will only use a very weak form of non-monotone inductive definition and we will only be interested in models that are generated starting from a finite evidence basis. The second problem occurs in two places. First we have to guarantee that the inductive definition of our new model construction generates strong models. This is needed to show that the class of finitely generated strong models is recursively enumerable. Second we introduce a new form of generated submodel which preserves the property of being a strong model. This is needed to establish completeness with respect to finitely generated strong models.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we recall the definition of the justification logic JT45 CS that corresponds to the traditional model logic S5. We present a semantics (based on M-models [17] ) for JT45 CS and establish soundness and completeness with respect to arbitrary strong models. In order to show decidability of JT45 CS , we need a class of models that satisfies the assumptions of Lemma 1. In Section 3 we introduce the class of finitely generated strong models and establish that 1. the satisfaction relation for finitely generated strong models is decidable, and 2. the class of finitely generated strong models is recursively enumerable.
Then in the following section we show that JT45 CS is complete with respect to finitely generated strong models. Hence decidability of JT45 CS follows by Lemma 1. Section 5 discusses the situation for other logics. We show that the justification logics J5 CS , J45 CS , and JT5 CS are decidable, too. However, we also show that the condition of a finite constant specification is very important for our proof. Finally, we conclude the paper by mentioning some open problems and future work.
Justification Logic
Justification terms are built from constants c i and variables x i according to the following grammar:
We denote the set of terms by Tm. Formulae are built from atomic propositions p i according to the following grammar:
Prop denotes the set of atomic propositions and Fm denotes the set of formulae. We use ⊥ as an abbreviation for p ∧ ¬p where p is some fixed atomic proposition. For a formula F , we denote the set of subformulae of F by subfml(F ).
The axioms of JT45 CS consist of all instances of the following schemes:
1. all propositional tautologies For a constant specification CS the deductive system JT45 CS is the Hilbert system given by the axioms above and by the rules modus ponens and axiom necessitation:
We are going to introduce a semantics for JT45 CS that is based on Mmodels [17] .
Definition 2 (Evidence relation). Let CS be a constant specification. An admissible evidence relation E is a subset of Tm × Fm that satisfies the following conditions:
• E is an admissible evidence relation,
• ν ⊆ Prop is a valuation. We say a formula F is satisfied in a model M if M F . We say a formula F is valid if for all strong models M we have that F is satisfied in M.
Theorem 6 (Soundness). Let CS be a constant specification. If a formula A is derivable in JT45 CS , then A is valid.
Proof. The proof is standard. Let us only show the case for the negative introspection axiom where the strong evidence property is used.
Let M = (E, ν) be a strong model and assume M ¬t : A. From M t : A, by the strong evidence property, we infer that (t, A) ∈ E. Thus (?t, ¬t : A) ∈ E by the closure conditions for admissible evidence relations. Again by the strong evidence property we conclude M ?t : ¬t : A.
In order to establish completeness we perform a canonical model construction.
Definition 7. Let CS be a constant specification. A set Φ of formulae is called consistent if there exists a formula A that is not derivable from Φ in JT45 CS . A set Φ is called maximal consistent if it is consistent and has no consistent proper extensions.
Lemma 9. Let Γ be a maximal consistent set of formulae. The relation E Γ is an admissible evidence relation.
Proof. We have to verify that E Γ satisfies the closure conditions of an admissible evidence relation. Let us only show the case for negative introspection. Assume (t, F ) ∈ E Γ . That means, by definition, that t : F ∈ Γ. Since Γ is maximal consistent, we have ¬t : F ∈ Γ. Moreover, every maximal consistent set contains every axiom. In particular, ¬t : F → ?t : ¬t : F ∈ Γ. Since maximal consistent sets are closed under modus ponens, we find ?t : ¬t : F ∈ Γ. By definition, this implies (?t, ¬t :
Lemma 10 (Truth lemma). Let Γ be a maximal consistent set of formulae. For every formula F we have M Γ F iff F ∈ Γ.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of the formula F . 
2. The boolean cases easily follow by the induction hypothesis.
Since Γ is maximal consistent, it contains the reflection axiom, that is t : A → A ∈ Γ. Since maximal consistent sets are closed under modus ponens, we find A ∈ Γ. By the induction hypothesis, we get M Γ A.
Together with (1), this implies M Γ t : A.
To show the the reverse direction we assume t : A ∈ Γ. Then, by definition, (t, A) ∈ E Γ . Hence M Γ t : A. 3 Inductively generated models
In this section we show that it is possible to inductively generate admissible evidence relations. This allows us to introduce the class of finitely generated strong models that satisfies the conditions of Lemma 1.
We need the following auxiliary definition.
Definition 12 (Rank). The rank of a term is inductively defined by:
Definition 13 (Inductively generated evidence relation). An evidence base B is a subset of Tm×Fm. The evidence base B extends a constant specification
We inductively generate an evidence relation E B such that B ⊆ E B . By induction on the natural number i we define the stages E i B as follows.
if rk(s · t) = i + 1 and there exists a formula B with
if rk(!s) = i + 1 and there exists a formula F such that
if rk(?s) = i + 1 and there exists a formula F such that F = ¬s : F and (s,
Remark 14. The generation of the evidence relation is performed by a non-monotone inductive definition. The case that deals with negative introspection has, of course, negation built in. Thus the evidence relation that we construct will not be least fixed point but only an arbitrary fixed point. In fact, admissible evidence relations for negative introspection cannot be minimal: Kuznets [16, Example 3.3 .43] shows very nicely how to construct two incomparable evidence relations.
Lemma 15. Let B be a evidence base extending the constant specification CS. Then the relation E B is an admissible evidence relation.
Proof. We have to show that E B satisfies the conditions of Definition 2. The only critical case is when (t, A) ∈ E B . Then (t, A) ∈ E i B for i = rk(t). Since rk(?t) = rk(t) + 1, we find (?t, ¬t : A) ∈ E i+1 B . Thus (?t, ¬t : A) ∈ E B . Definition 16 (Finitely generated model). Let CS be a finite constant specification. Let B be a finite evidence base extending CS and ν be a finite valuation. Then we call M B = (E B , ν) a finitely generated model.
Next we are going to show that the satisfaction relation for finitely generated models is decidable. We first need two auxiliary lemmas.
Proof. First observe that
Assume now that (s, F ) ∈ E B and rk(s) ≤ i. Let j be the least natural number such that (s, F ) ∈ E 
(s,
By the induction hypothesis there are only finitely many Theorem 19. The satisfaction relation for finitely generated models is decidable.
Proof. Let CS be a finite constant specification. Let B be a finite evidence base extending it and ν be a finite valuation. First we show that for any term s and any formula F , (s, F ) ∈ E B is decidable.
By Lemma 17 we know (s, F ) ∈ E B if and only if (s,
. Thus it is enough to show by induction on j that we can decide (s, F ) ∈ E j B for every j. The base case j = 0 is decidable since B is finite. For the case j = i + 1 we show that all cases in the definition of E Let M B = (E B , ν). Decidability of M B F follows by induction on the structure of F . We distinguish the following cases:
1. The atomic case follows from the assumption that ν is finite.
The boolean cases follow by the induction hypothesis.
3. F = s : F . We have that M B F is decidable by the induction hypothesis and (s, F ) ∈ E B is decidable by (3) . Hence M B s : F is decidable. Now we show that it is decidable whether a finitely generated model is a strong model. Hence the class of finitely generated strong models is recursively enumerable.
Lemma 20. Let CS be a constant specification, B be an evidence base extending CS, and ν be a valuation. Consider the model M B = (E B , ν). If for all terms r and formulae F we have 
(r, F ) ∈ E
i+1 B because of (r, F ) ∈ E i B . The claim follows by the induction hypothesis.
3. r = s+t, rk(s+t) = i+1, and (s, F ) ∈ E i B . By the induction hypothesis we find M B F . 4 . r = s+t, rk(s+t) = i+1, and (t, F ) ∈ E i B . By the induction hypothesis we find M B F . 
The if-direction is given by the previous lemma. For the other direction we assume that M B is a strong model and (r, F ) ∈ B. Hence we have (r, F ) ∈ E B and by the strong evidence property M B r : F which implies M B F . Decidability of (4) follows from Theorem 19 since B is finite.
Corollary 22. The class of finitely generated strong models is recursively enumerable.
Definition 23. Let Φ be a finite set of formulae. We say a term t occurs in Φ if there is an F ∈ Φ with s : G ∈ subfml(F ) such that t is a subterm of s. We let T Φ be the set of all terms that occur in Φ. We set:
Lemma 24. Let Φ be a finite set of formulae. There exists a set of formulae clo(Φ) such that
Proof. Assume that we have a fixed enumeration of all formulae. If the formula F is the i-th formula in this enumeration, then we call i the index of F . Depending on this enumeration we define for each set Π of formulae a new set Π as follows. Let s : F be the formula with least index such that s : F ∈ M(Π). We set Π := Π ∪ C Π (s : F ). If M(Π) is empty, then we set Π := Π.
First we observe
The inclusion T Π ⊆ T Π is trivial. For the other direction we let r be a term that occurs in Π . If r occurs in Π, we are done. Otherwise r must occur in C Π (s : F ) with s : F ∈ M(Π). By definition we have
We distinguish two cases.
1. There exists t:G ∈ C Π (s:F ) such that r is a subterm of t. Since t ∈ T Π , we also have r ∈ T Π and we are done.
2. Otherwise there exists t : G ∈ C Π (s : F ) such that r occurs in G. Since G ∈ subfml(F ), we also have that r occurs in F . By s : F ∈ M(Π), we know s : F ∈ Π. Hence r occurs in Π and we are done.
Thus we have established (5). Now we take the given set Φ and define a sequence Φ 0 , Φ 1 , . . . of sets of formulae by 1. Φ 0 is the closure of Φ under subformulae, 2. Φ m+1 := Φ m .
We prove the following for all j by induction on j:
1. Φ ⊆ Φ j . This easily follows from Φ ⊆ Φ 0 and Φ i ⊆ Φ i+1 .
2. Φ j is the closed under subformulae. Φ 0 is closed under subformulae by definition. Let B ∈ Φ i+1 and A ∈ subfml(B). If B ∈ Φ i , then A ∈ Φ i ⊆ Φ i+1 by the induction hypothesis. If B ∈ Φ i , then B ∈ C Φ i (s : F ) for some suitable s : F ∈ Φ i and B has the from t : G with G ∈ subfml(F ).
By G ∈ subfml(F ) we get A ∈ subfml(F ). Since s : F ∈ Φ i and, by the induction hypothesis, Φ i is closed under subformulae, we find
3. Φ j is finite. Φ 0 is finite since there are only finitely many subformulae of the finitely many formulae in Φ. To show that Φ i+1 is finite we first observe that Φ i is finite by the induction hypothesis. The set C Φ i (s : F ) that is added is also finite: it contains only formulae of the form t : G where t ∈ T Φ i and G ∈ subfml(F ). Since T Φ i and subfml(F ) are finite, also the set C Φ i (s : F ) must be finite. Hence Φ i+1 is finite.
Note that (5) implies for all i, j
Now we show that
So assume r : G ∈ C Φ i (s : F ) and t : H ∈ C Φ i+1 (r : G). That is t ∈ T Φ i+1 and H ∈ subfml(G). Because of (5) we have t ∈ T Φ i and because of G ∈ subfml(F )
we have H ∈ subfml(F ). Thus t : H ∈ C Φ i (s : F ) and, therefore, t : H ∈ Φ i+1 . Hence (8) is established. Since there cannot be an infinite descending sequence of natural numbers, (7) implies that there exists m such that deg(Φ m ) = 0, which means
Finally, we set clo(Φ) = Φ m .
Lemma 25. Let Φ be a finite set of formulae and B be an evidence base such that (s, F ) ∈ B implies s : F ∈ clo(Φ). Further, let r be a term occurring in clo(Φ). Then we have for all j that
Proof. By induction on j. The case j = 0 holds by assumption. Let j = i+1. We distinguish the following cases. 5. r = !s. This case is not possible since we consider only implications.
6. r = ?s. This case is not possible since we consider only implications.
Definition 26. Let M = (E, ν) be a model and Φ a finite set of formulae that contains CS. The Φ-generated submodel M Φ of M is defined by (E Φ, ν Φ) where 1. E Φ is the evidence relation generated from the base B Φ given by (t, F ) ∈ B Φ iff t : F ∈ clo(Φ) and (t, F ) ∈ E, 2. ν Φ is given by
Remark 27. Since we require that Φ contains CS, the above definition guarantees that B Φ extends CS. Thus by Lemma 15 we know that E Φ is an admissible evidence relation and hence M Φ is indeed a model.
Moreover, by Lemma 24 we find that clo(Φ) is finite. Thus M Φ is a finitely generated model.
Lemma 28. Let M = (E, ν) be a model, Φ a finite set of formulae that contains CS, and M Φ = (E Φ, ν Φ) the Φ-generated submodel of M. We have for all r : F ∈ clo(Φ) that (r, F ) ∈ E if and only if (r, F ) ∈ E Φ.
Proof. From left to right. Assume r : F ∈ clo(Φ) and (r, F ) ∈ E. We have (r, F ) ∈ B Φ by definition and hence (r, F ) ∈ E Φ.
From right to left. We show that (r,
implies (r, F ) ∈ E by induction on j. The case j = 0 holds by the definition of B Φ . Let j = i + 1. We distinguish the following cases. . By the closure conditions on clo(Φ) and the induction hypothesis we find (s, F ) ∈ E. Thus (s + t, F ) ∈ E follows by the closure conditions of E.
3. r = s + t and (t, F ) ∈ E i B Φ . Similar to the previous case. 
Hence by the induction hypothesis we get (s, A → F ) ∈ E. Moreover, by the closure conditions on clo(Φ), (9) and r:F ∈ clo(Φ) together imply t : A ∈ clo(Φ). Thus by the induction hypothesis we infer (t, A) ∈ E.
Finally by the closure conditions on E we conclude (s · t, F ) ∈ E.
5. r = !s and (s,
. By the closure conditions on clo(Φ) and the induction hypothesis we find (s, F ) ∈ E. Thus (!s, s : F ) ∈ E follows by the closure conditions of E.
, and rk(r) = i + 1. By Lemma 17 we find (s, F ) ∈ E B Φ . By the closure conditions on clo(Φ) we get s : F ∈ clo(Φ). Hence by the direction from left to right we obtain (s, F ) ∈ E. Thus (?s, ¬s : F ) ∈ E follows by the closure conditions on E.
Lemma 29. Let M = (E, ν) be a model and Φ be a finite set of formulae that contains CS. Further, let M Φ be the Φ-generated submodel of M. Then for all formulae F ∈ clo(Φ) we have M Φ F if and only if M F.
Proof. Proof by induction on the structure of F .
. Since p i ∈ clo(Φ) by assumption, this is equivalent to p i ∈ ν which is M p i .
2. The boolean cases follow immediately by the induction hypothesis. Since s : F ∈ clo(Φ), we find by Lemma 28 that (a) is equivalent to (a') (s, F ) ∈ E. Moreover (b) is equivalent to (b') M F by the induction hypothesis. Finally (a') and (b') together are equivalent to M s : F .
Lemma 30. Let M = (E, ν) be a model, Φ a finite set of formulae that contains CS, and M Φ the Φ-generated submodel of M. If M is a strong model, then M Φ is a strong model, too.
Proof. By Lemma 20 it is enough to show
So assume (t, F ) ∈ B Φ . That is (a) t : F ∈ clo(Φ) and (b) (t, F ) ∈ E. Since clo(Φ) is closed under subformulae we have (a') F ∈ clo(Φ). Since M is a strong model (b) implies M t : F from which we get (b') M F . From (a') and (b') we conclude by Lemma 29 that M Φ F . Hence (10) is established.
Theorem 31. Let CS be a finite constant specification. Let F be a formula that is not derivable in JT45 CS . Then there exists a finitely generated strong model M B with M B F .
Proof. By Theorem 11 we find a strong model M with M F . Let Φ be the union of {F } and CS. Since Φ is finite, we know that M Φ = (E Φ, ν Φ) is a finitely generated model. By Lemma 30 we know that M Φ is a strong model. Moreover, by Lemma 29 we find M Φ F . Thus the claim follows by setting M B := M Φ.
Corollary 32. JT45 CS is decidable for finite constant specifications CS.
Proof. Let C be the class of finitely generated strong models. By Theorem 6 know that JT45 CS is sound with respect to C and Theorem 31 gives us completeness of JT45 CS with respect to C. The class C is recursively enumerable by Corollary 22. Finally, by Theorem 19, the binary relation M F between formulae and models from C is decidable. Thus we have established the assumptions of Lemma 1 and conclude that JT45 CS is decidable.
Discussion
We have established decidability of JT45 CS . Our method also applies to the sublogics JT5 CS , J45 CS , and J5 CS that are given as follows.
JT5 CS is obtained from JT45 CS by dropping the Positive Introspection axiom. On the semantic side, we drop the clause for the !-operator in the definition of an admissible evidence relation. Decidability of JT5 CS is established essentially in the same way as decidability of JT45 CS , simply delete all cases dealing with the !-operator.
J45 CS is obtained from JT45 CS by dropping the Reflection axiom. On the semantic side, we adapt the satisfaction relation such that of M t:A if and only if (t, A) ∈ E (i.e. we drop the additional condition M A). Using this definition of satisfaction in a model, the strong evidence property trivializes. Again, we can show decidability as above. However, we do not need to take care of the strong evidence property. In particular, we do not need Lemma 20 and Lemma 30.
J5 CS is obtained from J45 CS by dropping the Positive Introspection axiom. Again, we drop all cases dealing with the !-operator in the treatment of J45 CS and easily obtain decidability of J5 CS .
Theorem 33. The logics J5 CS , J45 CS , JT5 CS , and JT45 CS are decidable for finite constant specifications CS.
Often, decidability for a justification logic is not established for finite constant specifications but for schematic constant specifications that are defined as follows. It is open whether our approach can be adapted to deal with schematic constant specifications. Essentially, there are two problems when the constant specification CS is schematic.
1. We cannot decide whether M B is a strong model, see Lemma 21. Our proof requires that CS is a finite set since we check for each element of CS whether is satisfies the strong evidence property.
2. We cannot decide the satisfaction relation for finitely generated models, see Theorem 19. The proof of that theorem relies on the fact that a given evidence term can justify only finitely many implications (Lemma 18), which, of course, is not the case for schematic constant specifications. The usual 'trick' of working with schemes in the construction of the evidence relation does not work either: even if there are only finitely many schemes A → F , we would have to check whether there is a most general unifier of A and infinitely many schemes B.
Conclusion
Justification logics are modal logics that include justifications for the agent's knowledge. So far, there were no decidability results available for justification logics with negative introspection. To address this issue, we have developed a novel model construction for such logics. In particular we have shown how to inductively build a kind of M-model for negative introspection. Assuming a finite constant specification, we have defined the class of finitely generated strong models and established that this class is recursively enumerable and that the satisfaction relation for its models is decidable. Using a new submodel construction, we have also been able to show that JT45 CS is complete with respect to that class. Hence JT45 CS is decidable. Our technique also works for J5 CS , J45 CS , and JT5 CS .
The main future task in this line of research is to solve the decision problem for justification logics with negative introspection and schematic constant specifications. This will also include the treatment of logics with the D-axiom for which we have to adapt the methods to deal with so-called F-models [8] . Moreover, we believe that the tools we have developed in this paper will also allow us to decide more complex logics like an extension of justifications for common knowledge [7] with negative introspection.
